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Insurance Fund), 
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Defendant/Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The parties have resolved the issue of the allocation of 
Gilbert Lamb's temporary total disability payments among them-
selves. The only remaining issue is the allocation of other work-
men's compensation benefits payable to Gilbert Lamb. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gilbert Lamb had a pre-existing lumbar condition and was 
involved in a series of industrial accidents in which he further 
injured the lumbar region of his back. Thii workmen's compen-
sation case involves the allocation of workmen's compensation 
benefits between the Jordan School District (self-insured), the 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah and the Second Injury Fund. 
No. 860272-CA 
Priority No. 6 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Other parties have set forth pertinent facts and record 
citations in their briefs. The following factual matters are sub-
mitted merely by way of clarification: 
1. The Jordan School District was self-insured when 
Gilbert Lamb injured his back on December 5, 1984. 
2. On three prior occasions — November 18, 1980, August 
10, 1982 and June 14, 1984 — while in the employ of the Jordan 
School District, Gilbert Lamb injured his back in industrial acci-
dents. (R. 209-211) The Workers Compensation Fund or its prede-
cessor was the workmen's compensation carrier for the Jordan 
School District on those occasions. 
3. The medical panel rendered a report in this case 
which was adopted by the Industrial Commission and which was not 
contested by the parties. (R. 212, 256) 
4. The medical panel found that Gilbert R. Lamb had a 
pre-existing back problem which resulted in a 12 1/2% permanent 
impairment. The panel found that Mr. Lamb's November 18, 1980 
accident did not increase his impairment in any way but that the 
three later industrial accidents in which Gilbert Lamb was involved 
did aggravate and increase his permanent impairment rating. The 
panel found that the three accidents which occurred in August of 
1982, June of 1984 and December of 1984, respectively, combined to 
result in an additional impairment of 12 1/2%. (R. 212) 
5. Significantly, the medical panel found that of Gilbert 
Lamb's various industrial injuries, those injuries he sustained on 
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August 10, 1982 were "foremost in causing his ongoing symptoms." 
Of Gilbert Lamb's 12 1/2% increased impairment over and above his 
impairment from pre-existing conditions, the Industrial Commission 
assigned 4% as the responsibility of the June 14, 1984 accident, 4% 
the responsibility of the December 5, 1984 accident and 4 1/2% the 
responsibility of the August 10, 1982 accident. None of the par-
ties have assailed these findings. (R. 212, 213, 254) 
6. Gilbert Lamb underwent lumbar surgery on March 14, 
1985 as a combined result of all of his accidents and his pre-
existing condition. The period of recovery subsequent to the 
surgery "also resulted from all three accidents and pre-existing 
conditions." (R. 256) 
7. The Industrial Commission found that 16% of Gilbert 
Lamb's present overall impairment was caused by the accident of 
December 5, 1984, and ordered the Jordan School District 
(self-insured) to pay 16% of Gilbert Lamb's medical expenses, 
temporary total benefits and other workmen'is compensation benefits. 
(R. 209-213; R. 254-257) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This defendant agrees completely with the summary of 
argument set forth in the brief filed by the Second Injury Fund 
and adopts that argument herein. 
Additionally, §35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, and num-
erous Supreme Court cases construing that statute have held that 
"the liability of an employer for compensation to its employee 
shall be for the industrial injury only." The medical panel, 
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Administrative Law Judge and a unanimous Industrial Commission all 
found that only 16% of Gilbert Lamb's impairment was due to the 
accident of December 5, 1984. None of the parties have taken 
issue with that finding. Consequently, fairness dictates and 
§35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated, and applicable Utah cases require 
that the Jordan School District (self-insured) should only be 
responsible to pay its pro rata share of Gilbert Lamb's workmen's 
compensation benefits. The unanimous Order of the Industrial 
Commission dated October 23, 1986 should be affirmed in its 
entirety except as to temporary total compensation benefits. As 
to these benefits, the parties have apparently agreed that Jordan 
School District (self-insured) owes 16% of those benefits as per 
the Industrial Commission's Order and the Second Injury Fund owes 
the remaining 84% of the benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO AN ALLOCATION OF 
TEMPORARY TOTAL WORKERS COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS. 
The Second Injury Fund agrees with the Workers 
Compensation Fund that as to Gilbert Lamb's temporary total com-
pensation, the Second Injury Fund should pay 84% and the Jordan 
School District (self-insured) should pay the remaining 16%. In 
other words, these parties have agreed that the Order of the 
Industrial Commission dated October 23, 1986 (R. 256) may be 
modified to require the Second Injury Fund to pay the $5,214.14 
which the Industrial Commission had ordered the Workers 
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Compensation Fund to pay. Jordan School District does not quarrel 
with this apportionment since the apportionment does not change 
the percentage or amount of money required to be paid by the 
Jordan School District, 
In short, the parties have resolved among themselves the 
issue of temporary total compensation, attorney's fees and 
interest on the temporary total amounts. Accordingly, this court 
need not concern itself with this issue fur|ther. 
POINT II. 
THE APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY FOR REMAINING 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFIJTS AS ORDERED 
BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS CORRECT AND 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The Workers Compensation Fund in its brief does not 
serious contend that the Jordan School District (self-insured) 
should be responsible for any more of Gilbert Lamb's benefits than 
it was ordered to pay by the Industrial Comtnission in the Order of 
August 20, 1986 as modified by the entire Ihdustrial Commission's 
Order of October 23, 1986. (R. 209-215; 254-258) Although the 
Workers Compensation Fund pays lip service to the outdated and 
inapplicable cases of Duane Brown Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial 
Comm., 29 Utah 2d 478, 511 P.2d 743 (1973), and Mountain States 
Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 535 f>. 2d 1249 (Utah 1975), 
the Fund does acknowledge in its brief that the new and 
controlling case is Richfield Care Center v^ Torgerson, 52 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 23 (February 12, 1987). 
In Torgerson, the Supreme Court unanimously held that 
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each industrial injury must be separately evaluated and "the 
liability of the employer for such compensation shall be for the 
industrial injury only." _Ic3. 24. The Torgerson decision has been 
discussed at length in the briefs filed by the Workers Compensation 
Fund and Second Injury Fund. However, the critical language of the 
case has not be excerpted in those briefs. In concluding its 
opinion, the Supreme Court wrote: 
In the instant case, following the 1980 
accident, Torgerson had a total impairment 
of five percent, two and one-half percent 
attributable to preexisting conditions and 
two and one-half percent attributable to the 
1980 accident. Following the 1982 accident, 
Torgerson had a seven and one-half percent 
total impairment, five percent attributable 
to preexisting conditions. Thus, the proper 
apportionment of liability should be one-
half to the employer and one-half to the 
Second Injury Fund for the benefits paid for 
the 1980 accident and one-third to the 
employer and two-thirds to the Second Injury 
Fund for the benefits paid for the 1982 
accident. 
The case is remanded for the purpose of 
entering an order apportioning liability 
consistent with this opinion. No costs 
awarded. _IcL 24. 
David v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 649 P.2d 82 (Utah 
1982), is a recent case directly on point. This decision was 
relied upon by the Industrial Commission in its order allocating 
workmen's compensation benefits. The reliance of the Industrial 
Commission was not misplaced. The same situation was present in 
David as is present here. In David, medical expenses as well as 
disability compensation benefits were apportioned between the 
State Insurance Fund, the workmen's compensation carrier for 
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plaintiff's first employer, and the Industrial Indemnity Company, 
the workmen's compensation carrier for plaintiff's second 
employer. When applied to the facts of thi|s case, the David deci-
sion requires that the allocation made by t|he Industrial 
Commission be affirmed. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Comm. 
of Utah, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983), is another illustrative case. 
In this case the Supreme Court affirmed the allocation of medical 
benefits which the Industrial Commission ordered be made among 
workmen's compensation insurers. Certainly there is no reason to 
treat disability compensation benefits any differently than medi-
cal expenses which were at issue in the U.S|. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co. case. Moreover, this decision re-emphafeizes the well-
established fact that an employer should only be held responsible 
to pay an injured employee compensation and medical care for just 
the accident at issue and not for prior accidents or prior impair-
ments the employee may have sustained or suffered. 
Although American Coal Co. v. Sand$trom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1984), and Veyo Concrete Products v. Industrial Comm., 710 P.2d 
172 (Utah 1985), may not specifically answet the question of 
allocation of liability as between the Workers Compensation Fund 
and the Second Injury Fund, these cases clearly and unambiguously 
support the logic of the Industrial Commission's Order to the 
effect that the Jordan School District is nc}t responsible to pay 
any more than 16% of Gilbert Lamb's worker'^ compensation disabil-
ity benefits. 
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In American Coaly the court articulated the facts as 
follows: 
Sandstrom sustained personal injury in four 
separate industrial accidents during the 
period between 1977 and 1981. The State 
Insurance Fund was the insurance carrier for 
each of Sandstrom's employers at the time 
of the accidents. As a result of the 
accidents, Sandstrom suffers from a total 
over-all impairment of 20% permanent partial 
disability of the whole man to his back and 
10% permanent partial disability of the 
whole man to his neck. The parties stipulated 
that of the 20% loss of body function attributable 
to the back injuries, the subject matter of 
this appeal, 10% was attributable to the 1981 
accident and 10% to the pre-existing conditions 
resulting from the 1977 accident. Sandstrom 
did not seek or obtain compensation benefits 
for the injuries sustained in the 1977 accident. 
At the Industrial Commission level, the State Insurance 
Fund sought reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for 
payments the State Insurance Fund had made for medical care and 
temporary total disability. The administrative law judge denied 
reimbursement requiring that the payment of temporary total disa-
bility and medical benefits to Sandstrom up until the date of his 
stabilization should be the exclusive responsibility of the 
employer and its carrier. Sandstrom1s employer filed a motion to 
review with the Industrial Commission. The motion was denied. 
The employer then appealed, seeking reimbursement for 50% of the 
temporary total disability benefits paid. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission 
holding that the Second Injury Fund was required to reimburse the 
employer's insurer for 50% of the temporary total disability 
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payment it had made. The court held that since 50% of 
Sandstrom's disability was caused by pre-existing conditions, the 
Second Injury Fund must be responsible for 50% of Sandstrom's 
temporary total disability payments. In reaching its decision, 
the court analyzed the 1981 amendments to §35-1-69 and concluded 
that the statute required the Second Injury Fund to reimburse the 
employer for 50% of the temporary total disability payments the 
employer had paid Sandstrom. 
In Veyo Concrete Products, Inc., tlhe Supreme Court set 
forth the facts as follows: 
One Frederick Paulus was employed by Veyo in 
1978 when the truck he was dr 
He was thrown from the vehicl 
the rear axle. As a result, 
iving blew a tire. 
\s and pinned under 
he required 
extensive medical treatment alnd was unable to 
work for a period of time. H 
and/or its insurer, the State 
paid the medical expenses inc 
is employer, Veyo, 
Insurance Fund, 
brred and the 
temporary total disability awarded. A medical 
panel later determined that o 
whole-man disability assigned 
the accident, 7/13ths was att 
injuries existing prior to the accident. The 
panel also found that the 197 
f the 13 percent 
to Paulus after 
kributable to 
B industrial 
accident did not aggravate the preexisting 
injuries and that the disabilities attributable 
to the 1978 acciedent injuries were not 
otherwise made greater by the preexisting 
injuries. 
At the Industrial Commission level, the administrative 
law judge reasoned that since the pre-existtLng injuries had not 
made that portion of Paulus1 incapacity due to the 1978 
industrial accident greater than it would otherwise have been, 
the State Insurance Fund was not entitled tp any reimbursement 
for temporary total disability payments it r^ ade to Paulus. The 
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Industrial Commission declined to disturb the administrative 
judge's ruling and Paulus' employer and insurer appealed. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court framed the issue as 
follows: 
No portion of the medical expenses or the time 
off from work that resulted in the disability 
award was caused by the employee's preexisting 
impairments. Yet the employer and its insurer 
now seek to recover from the Fund an amount 
equal to the proportion of the employee's 
total disability rating that is attributable 
to his preexisting impairments. The Fund 
claims that it should not contribute anything. 
Id. at 173. 
The Court in reversing the Industrial Commission and ordering 
reimbursement held: 
The matter was settled in Intermountain 
Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, Utah, 610 P.2d 
334 (1980). There we held that under almost 
identical facts, the Fund did have to pay 
the employer. _Id. at 336-37. 
Then in its only footnote, the Supreme Court cited American Coal 
Company as holding that the legislature's attempt to change the 
result in Capitano had been imperfectly executed. 
In the present case, Gilbert Lamb's disability and time 
off work was caused in part by his pre-existing impairment. 
Worker's compensation payments paid to Mr. Lamb and medical 
expenses paid to him were a direct result of his pre-existing 
impairment combined with the effects of the December 5, 1984 acci-
dent. However, Veyo Concrete Products, Inc. and American Coal 
Co. hold that even if there was "no relationship" worker's compen-
sation benefits that are entirely unrelated to the employee's pre-
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existing impairments which an employer is required to pay are 
reimburseable to the employer from the Secoind Injury Fund. 
The only real issue in this case ajppears not to involve 
the Jordan School District (self-insured). Rather, the issue 
seems to be whether or not some of the benelfits which a unanimous 
Industrial Commission ordered the Workers Compensation Fund to pay 
should be shifted over to the Second Injury Fund. Section 35-1-69 
and the above-cited cases make it clear beyond dispute that the 
Jordan School District should only pay its j?ro rata share. This 
is what the Industrial Commission ordered it to do and this Order 
should be affirmed on appeal. 
Insofar as the allocation of benefits between the Workers 
Compensation Fund and the Second Injury Fun<ft is concerned, this is 
a matter best left in the able hands of counsel for the Industrial 
Commission and the Second Injury Fund. However, the Jordan School 
District submits that for the reasons specified in the Second 
Injury Fund's brief, which brief the Jordan School District adopts 
and incorporates by reference herein, the Oi^ der of the Industrial 
Commission, except as modified by agreement of the parties, should 
be affirmed in its entirety. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons specified above, a^ well as all reasons 
discussed in the Second Injury Fund's brief, the Order of the 
Industrial Commission should be affirmed exdept as the Second 
Injury Fund and Workers Compensation Fund h^ve modified that Order 
by mutual agreement. 
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? Dated this 0 day of I \q^J , 1987. 
STROJ 
By_ 
R\gfoert~ A, Burton 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Respondent, Jordan School 
District 
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